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HAZARDOUS TOYS: PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENTAL
APPROACHES TO PRODUCT SAFETY
Since the landmark decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.'
in 1916, courts and legislatures have gradually repudiated the philos-
ophy of caveat emptor. 2
 That philosophy has been supplanted by one
of consumer protection which is concerned primarily with promoting
and insuring product safety prior to market distribution.' To accom-
plish this latter objective, three principal mechanisms are available.
The private suit for damages, in addition to compensating the injured
Party, can influence the manufacturer to improve the quality of his
product through the economic pressure exerted by large damage
awards. Second, the private efforts of independent testing organiza-
tions and industry in the form of self-regulation and standardization
can contribute to the quality of consumer goods. Finally, federal legis-
lation may be enacted where a class of products presents a substan-
tial risk of harm and private remedies are ineffective in reducing that
risk.
-Until recently these three mechanisms have had little effect in
improving the safety of toys. In 1967 the National Commission on
Product Safety (hereinafter the Commission) was appointed to study
"the scope and adequacy of measures now employed to protect con-
sumers against hazardous household products."' Its interim report,
issued in 1969, was devoted exclusively to toys, and concluded that
there exist "grave inadequacies in the protection of children against
death and injury from hazardous toys."'
This comment will examine the merits of these three mechanisms
as presently utilized to promote the safety of toys. It will be shown
that the products liability suit and industry self-regulation have not
been effective in achieving safety in the design and manufacture of
1
 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2
 See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, comments a-q (1965) ;
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.]. 1099 (1960) ; Prosser, The Fall of
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966); Comment,
Products Liability—The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence, and Strict Tort Liability, 64
Mich. L. Rev. 1350 (1966).
3
 Federal legislation designed to protect the consumer has been directed toward
several classes of products. These enactments generally authorize a designated federal
agency to promulgate standards of safety and performance. Methods of enforcing com-
pliance vary and include inspection of the manufacturer's premises and records, injunction,
seizure and criminal sanctions. See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
of 1966, 15 U.S.C. 1 1381 et seq. (Supp. III, 1968) ; Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1191 et seq. (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1969) ; Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1964), as amended, 21 U.S.C.
§ 360(a) et seq. (Supp. IV, 1969) ; Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261 et
seq. (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (q) (Supp. IV, 1969), as further amended,
Pub. L. No. 91-113, § 2(a) (D) et seq., 83 Stat. 187 (Nov. 6, 1969).
Act of Nov, 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-146, § 2(a), 81 Stat. 466.
5
 National Comm'n on Product Safety, Interim Report Recommending Enactment of
the Child Protection Act of 1969, at i (1969) [hereinafter cited as Interim Report].
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toys. The failure of these private efforts has motivated the enactment
of the Child Protection and Toy Safety Act of 1969. 6 It is submitted
that industry cooperation, brought about through conscientious en-
forcement of the provisions of this Act, can go far toward accom-
plishing the goal of toy safety.
I. THE PROBLEM
Until recently few statistical studies had attempted to isolate
facts concerning the nature and incidence of toy-related injuries. This
was due in part to the difficulty of definition. For purposes of this anal-
ysis, it might be said that there are three principal categories of house-
hold products which cause injury to children. The first includes those
household articles which are considered playthings only by the child.
This group includes drugs, cosmetics 7 and home appliances such as
refrigerators.' The second category includes those products which are
patently dangerous, such as air rifles, B-B guns," and fireworks.' The
third category is that of principal concern in this study, and will be
referred to as "defective toys." It includes those items manufactured
and sold for use by children and which embody defects in design ren-
dering them unfit for such use and a potential source of injury.
The Commission report cited several types of design defects in
toys which are currently on the market. Sharp objects are frequently
concealed beneath an apparently harmless exterior. For example, the
hair and clothing of some dolls are fastened by sharp pins; others con-
tain spikes designed to keep the doll in a firm position. Simulated home
appliances such as ovens, cornpoppers and irons represent another
class of often defectively designed toys. The Commission found that
inadequate insulation and inordinately high temperatures account for
the high incidence of shock and burn injuries attributable to such
products." For instance, the external surface of a metal casting set
was shown to reach a temperature of 600° F. The inside surfaces, easily
accessible to the user, approached 800°F. 12 Other products exhibited
before the Commission were deemed defective because of the manu-
O Pub. L. No. 91-113, § I et seq., 83 Stat. 187 (Nov. 6, 1969).
• Some protection is afforded by the labeling requirements of the Federal Food Drug
and Cosmetic Act. 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1969). However, the
Act is directed primarily toward standardizing the quality of such products rather than
protecting children from misuse.
8 Current federal legislation prohibits introduction into interstate commerce of any
refrigerator not equipped with a safety device enabling the door to be opened from the
inside. 15 U.S.C. § 1211 (1964).
• Statutes in force in some states impliedly recognize that such items are not toys by
prohibiting both their sale to minors, see e.g. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 12A
(1959) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 3842 (1963), and possession by minors, see, e.g., Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 12B (1959); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 3844 (1963).
10 State statutes generally prohibit the sale, use or possession of fireworks by private
persons. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1605 (1956); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 8,
§ 211 (1964).
11 Interim Report 12, 18.
12 Id. at 12.
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facturer's choice of materials, such as highly flammable substances or
unstable plastics." Finally, the Commission heard testimony regard-
ing the dangers inherent in certain toys which may be classified as
projectiles. One such toy, alleged to have blinded a child, was shown
to travel at a velocity in excess of 80 miles per hour."
Reliable data on the number of injuries directly attributable to
defective toys has been unavailable. The few reported decisions which
have involved toy-related injuries do not adequately reflect the scope
of the design defect problem, since most of these cases involved patently
dangerous items such as air guns and fireworks." The infrequency of
private litigation involving defective toys may be due in part to two
factors. First, many parents are not aware of the potential danger of this
class of toys. Consequently, when their child is injured they tend to
blame their own inattention, or to accept the accident fatalistically as
part of the child's "growing up." Second, many of the injuries are not
considered serious enough to warrant the expense and inconvenience of
litigation,18
The incidence of toy-related injuries has been estimated by the
United States Public Health Service at about 700,000 per year. 17 A
study conducted in Florida of 748 accidents involving children revealed
that 84, or more than 10 percent, were related to commercial toys. 18
The Commission also noted the high incidence of injury among children,
reporting that
[o] f the nearly 56 million children under 15 years of age in
in the United States, more than 15,000 of them die each year
from accidents at a rate of 28 per 100,000 population. . . .
Another 17 million children annually are injured severely
enough to restrict normal activity or require medical atten-
tion—a rate of 300 per 1,000 population."
Although these statistics do not indicate the sources of injury, they
demonstrate the peculiar vulnerability of the infant consumer to many
types of injuries, including those from defective toys. Children are by
nature creative and curious, but frequently inexperienced and naive
concerning the product and its potential for harm. Toys, like other
products intended for use by children, are frequently bought for the user,
not by the user. Moreover, a child, unlike an adult, cannot be expected to
13 Id. at 16-17.
14 Id. at 19.
15
 See, e.g., Semeniuk v. 'Chentis, 1 Ill. App. 2d. 508, 117 N.E.2d 883 (1954) (air-
gun) ; Taylor v. Webster, 8 Ohio App. 2d 266, 221 N.E.2d 479 (1966) (airgun) Allen v.
Gornto, 100 Ga. App. 744, 112 S.E.2d 368 (1959) (fireworks) ; Pitts v. Basile, 35 Ill. 2d
49, 219 N.E.2d 472 (1966) (dart).
18
 Statement of Atty. Edward M. Swartz submitted to the Commission, Dec., 1968,
at 52 (on file in the office of B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.).
17
 HEW, Estimates of Injuries Involving Various Environmental Factors 10 (un-
dated).
18 P. Dykstra, Survey of Injuries Involving Toys and Playthings Sustained by Chil-
dren in Florida 3 (1962).
19 Interim Report 7.
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read instructions or heed written warnings. In this context educating the
consumer means educating the parent in purchasing and supervising the
use of the product; however, in many cases, a parent's control over
the child's use of a toy is limited. Finally, the toy, being an object of
curiosity, is likely to be subjected to considerable abuse. Thus, the
number of potentially hazardous toys in the marketplace, together with
the peculiar susceptibilities of the child consumer, present a problem of
sufficient magnitude to merit strong measures toward insuring the
safety of these products.
II. THE PRODUCT LIABILITY SUIT
In addition to performing its principal function of compensating
the injured plaintiff, the product liability suit has a secondary deter-
rent function in that it influences manufacturers and sellers to improve
the quality of their products. Arnold Elkind, chairman of the Commis-
sion, has observed:
Until manufacturers begin to understand that man cannot
be redesigned as tools and machines can, until safety is given
preference over price, style, and packaging, and until industry
embarks on a course of field testing, human factors analysis,
over-stress evaluation, and anticipatory consumer misuse—
the product liability lawsuit will continue to perform an im-
portant regulatory function in the market."
Any reliance upon the regulatory function of private litigation
rests upon the assumption that there is sufficient recovery by enough
plaintiffs to generate economic pressure upon the manufacturer. The
unsuccessful plaintiff has little impact on the industry. In the toy area
the efficacy of the product liability suit as a regulatory mechanism
has been reduced by limitations on the liability of manufacturers
and sellers, including insurmountable problems of proof and the re-
luctance of courts to impose a higher standard of care which would
require that toys be designed to withstand anticipated consumer misuse.
The marketing of toys, like other products, is subject to affirmative
common law and statutory duties imposed on both manufacturers and
vendors. Although the extent of these duties varies among the states,
some general similarities exist. It has been held that a toy manufacturer
is not an insurer of his product". in the sense that he does not guar-
antee that it will last indefinitely. The manufacturer's duty of care
includes an obligation to subject his products to reasonably careful
tests.22
 The duty on the seller requires him to warn of known but not
obvious dangers." The seller also has a duty to inspect the products
Elkind, Lawsuits for Product Safety, Trial, Dec.-Jan., 1969-1970, at 55.
21
 Simmons v. Gibbs Mfg. Co., 170 F. Supp. 818, 823 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
22
 See McCormick v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Co., 235 Mo. App. 612, 625, 144
S.W.2d 866, 871 (1940).
23
 See Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 28, (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957).
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he sells; however, this duty does not encompass discovering latent
defects.' In addition to these common law duties, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (U.C.C.) attaches an implied warranty of merchantability
—that the goods sold are "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used!'" The U.C.C. also imposes liability where it appears
that the product has been made the subject of an express warranty
and the injury is traceable to a breach of that warranty."
In addition to proving that one of these affirmative duties exists,
the plaintiff must establish that the product is defective and that there
exists a causal connection between the defect and the injury. The
difficulty in meeting these requirements of the plaintiff's burden of proof
accounts for the limited effectiveness of the product liability suit regard-
ing defective toys. The defenses of intervening negligence of a third
party and the contributory negligence of the injured party frequently
insulate manufacturers and retailers from liability." Related to the
problem of proving proximate cause is the lack of a sufficiently identi-
fiable standard of design defectiveness by which both courts and legisla-
tures may measure the safety of a particular toy product.
The formulation of a standard of design defectiveness is not con-
cerned with the mechanical processes by which a toy is produced, but
rather with the basic design of the product, including the choice of
materials, the position of component parts, and the use of various safety
features. For example, if a top were to break apart because a tack
holding a spring in place had been insecurely inserted, the manu-
facturer's negligence in the construction of the product would be
assertable. If, however, it were shown that a screw rather than a tack
should have been used to keep the spring in place, the defect would lie
in the basic design of the product. Obviously, a design defect is more
serious than one involving negligent manufacture since the design
defect affects the entire line of the product and, thus, increases the proba-
bility that every user of that product will be injured.
Until recently, the notion of a design defect in products liability
cases has received little attention. It has been observed that
[t]his . . . results partly from a reluctance to let a jury pass
on a product prepared by experts in the field, and partly from
the realization that a judgment for a particular plaintiff may
open the door to many additional claims and suits. Occasion-
ally there has been apprehension that a judgment for the
plaintiff will necessitate extensive remodeling, or perhaps even
removal from the market of some much-used and widely-ad-
24
 See Simmons v. Richardson Variety Stores, 51 Del. 80, 83, 137 A.2d 747, 749
(1957).
26 U.C.C. 2-314. All references to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the 1962
Official Text.
26 U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-715. For a pre-Code case recognizing liability for breach of
an express warranty in the sale of a toy, see Silverstein v. R. H. Macy & Co., 266 App.
Div. 5, 40 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1943).
27 See p. 486 infra.
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vertised product, with serious consequences to both the manu-
facturer and his employees.'
In spite of these considerations, recent deCisions involving products
other than toys indicate that the manufacturer's liability for defective
design is expanding. For example, a concealed-danger defect was at
issue in Matthews v. Lawnlite Co.,' where the plaintiff was severely
injured by the moving parts of an aluminum lounge chair. The court, in
reversing a dismissal, stated that "one is not required to guard against
danger in places where it is not expected to be." 3° The opinion further
stated that if this mechanism were necessary it should have been en-
closed in a housing." The court reasoned that the ordinary consumer
does not anticipate or guard against such concealed dangers. For this
reason it imposed on the manufacturer a higher standard of care in
designing the product to allow for the consumer's imperfect vigilance.
Similarly, this reasoning can be applied to the potential plaintiff injured
by a spike or other dangerous mechanism concealed in a doll. The manu-
facturer should be required to design the doll with the peculiar destruc-
tive traits of children in mind.
The manufacturer's failure to provide a safety feature or device
was the basis of the action in Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc." The
plaintiff, injured while operating a self-propelled cornpicker, alleged
that the product was negligently designed because it did not have a
reasonably safe shield over the moving chain mechanism. Although the
court was referred to an earlier case" in which it held that a failure to
provide a lawn mower guard was not the cause of the injury since the
danger was obvious, the court in Wright held that such a product is
sufficiently defective to warrant the imposition of liability. In reaching
this result the court reasoned:
The problem is dealt with as one of allocating a more or
less inevitable loss to be charged against a complex and
dangerous civilization, and liability is placed upon the party
best able to shoulder it. The defendant is held liable merely
because, as a matter of social adjustment, the conclusion is
that the responsibility should be his."
In holding the manufacturer liable for injuries caused by an open and
obvious danger, the court in Wright adopted a standard of strict
liability." Thus, the manufacturer who markets a product unreason-
28 NoeI,,Manufacturers' Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71
Yale L.J. 816 (1962).
29 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1966).
So Id. at 301.
31 id .
32 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966).
33 Murphy v. Cory Pump & Supply Co., 47 111. App. 2d 382, 197 N.E.2d 849 (1964).
34 68 Ill. App. 2d at 77, 215 N.E.2d at 469.
35 Id. at 76, 215 N.E.2d at 468, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 402A (1965) :
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
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ably dangerous to the user because of a defective condition assumes the
liability for injury regardless of whether all possible care was exercised
in the preparation of his product.
The adoption of strict liability, however, does not render the
manufacturer or other seller liable if the product is misused or used
in an abnormal way." Misuse is a major factor limiting the prospects
of recovery for toy-caused injuries. With respect to the patently danger-
ous class of toys such as baseball bats, air rifles and pocket knives,
consumer misuse bars recovery completely, making the product liability
action of negligible value in promoting the safety of this class of toys.
For example, in Strahlendorl v. Walgreen Co. 37 the plaintiff was struck
in the eye by a plastic airplane which was catapulted from a cardboard
launcher by the plaintiff's brother. In rendering judgement for the
defendant-retailer, the court emphasized that the defendant's only
negligence, if any, was his failure to warn of the dangers involved in
using the toy." However, the court held that this negligence was not
the proximate cause of the injury since the child's conduct in aiming
the plane at the plaintiff was the "substantial factor" in causing the
injury." Although there was some evidence that the plane was defec-
tively designed," it appears that this type of toy becomes a source of
injury only because it is misused. Since there is little the manufacturer
can do to reduce injury from these toys short of not produce them,
it is submitted that the courts will remain reluctant to impose liability
for injuries attributable to them.
The problem of misuse pertains as well to that class of toys contain-
ing design defects. However, it may be argued that the courts should
be less reluctant to impose liability upon the manufacturer since he
should anticipate the misuse, and design the product so as to minimize
its effect. Some courts, however, have failed to distinguish between toys
which are "unavoidably unsafe when misused" such as baseball bats,
and toys which are unsafe because of defective design. In the latter
class, product misuse is only the occasion of the injury, not its cause.
For example, in Simmons v. Gibbs 111 f g. Co.' a negligence action was
brought against the manufacturer on behalf of a three-year-old plaintiff
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product. . . .
80
 See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 2, at 824-28.
37
 16 Wis. 2d 421, 114 N.W.2d 823 (1962).
38
 Id. at 432, 114 N.W.2d at 829.
8° Id. at 426-29, 114 N.W.2d at 827.
40 An expert witness testified that the material used necessarily resulted in unstable
construction, and that the plane was capable of velocities between 30 and 90 m.p.h. Id.
at 432-33, 114 N.W.2d at 829.
41 170 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
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who suffered serious injury to one eye when a top broke apart. Plain-
tiff's expert testified that the tack used to secure the spring was not
adequate to contain the force of the spring and that a screw should
have been used.' Nevertheless, the court found for the defendant,
declining to accept the plaintiff's theory that this defect was the
proximate cause of injury. The court found that a causal connection
between the defect and the injury was a "mere possibility.”" In reach-
ing its decision the court emphasized the fact that the top had been
in use for two and one-half months, during which time it was subjected
to a considerable amount of abuse by the child."
In emphasizing the abuse given the top as a probable cause of the
accident, the court failed to resolve the crucial question at issue, that is,
to what extent should a toy manufacturer anticipate and guard against
abuse of his product? Had the court adopted the reasoning of Wright
or Matthews, it would have considered the child's abuse of the top as
foreseeable, and imposed an affirmative duty on the manufacturer to use
materials which would withstand that abuse."
Although there are no reported decisions involving the toys ex-
hibited before the Commission, the same reasoning should apply to the
situation where a child, by placing his hand in a toy oven or by tearing
a doll apart, incurs a serious injury. Arguably, in these instances the
child's conduct is negligent; however, his peculiar characteristics,
including his inability to protect himself from such dangers, should
require the manufacturer to anticipate the conduct and guard against
it."
One court has viewed the toy manufacturer's duty in terms of fore-
seeability of consumer misuse and has eliminated the defense of contribu-
tory negligence as a protection from liability for a defect in the product.
42 Id. at 821.
4s Id.
44 Id. at 822.
45 Presumably in each case the period of time during which the product should with-
stand anticipated abuse would present an issue of fact.
46 In Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962), a manufacturer of
furniture polish was held liable for the death of a child. Although both the child and its
mother were found to have been negligent, the court held defendant to a duty to warn
that the polish might be lethal if ingested. On the issue of "intended use" the court stated:
The defendants have contended throughout that they are liable only for
injuries caused in the course of the intended use of their product. . We agree
with the general principle but the application the defendants would have us
make of it here is much too narrow. "Intended use" is but a convenient adapta-
tion of the basic test of "reasonable foreseeability" framed to more specifically
fit the factual questions out of which arise questions of a manufacturer's liability
for negligence. "Intended use" is not an inflexible formula to be apodictically
applied to every case . . . .
[The manufacturer] must also be expected to anticipate the environment
which is normal for the use of his product and where, as here, that environ-
ment is the home, he must anticipate the reasonably foreseeable risks of the use
of his product in such an environment.
Id. at 83-84.
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In Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 47
 the plaintiff was injured when
a pogo stick he was using broke apart. In holding the defendant liable
on a theory of strict liability, the court took judicial notice of the fact
that a pogo stick is expected to be used in a rugged manner."
At present, the effectiveness of the product liability suit is limited in
promoting toy safety. With respect to the class of patently dangerous
toys such as baseball bats, pocket knives and air rifles, injuries generally
are attributable to consumer misuse rather than to a defect in the
product. With respect to defectively designed toys, there exist difficult
problems of proof, including the necessity of showing a legally sufficient
defect and the required proximate cause. Furthermore, the nature of
the damage suit, as essentially a private remedy, also accounts for its
limited effectiveness toward promoting product safety." Finally, even
assuming that the injured plaintiff does sue and recover, the "potential
liability of a manufacturer is often insulated through products liability
insurance and . . . few if any toy manufacturers are self-insurers.'
III. PRIVATE APPROACHES TO PRODUCT SAFETY
Because of the necessity of increasing the safety of products in-
tended for use by children, both independent testing organizations and
the toy industry have attempted to improve the quality of toys prior to
market distribution. The organizations which are directly involved in
the promotion of the safety of toys are of two types, those which are
primarily concerned with testing products and educating the public as
to their findings, and those which are primarily concerned with
promulgating standards of quality and performance.
Consumers Union has been active in furthering consumer educa-
tion. It is an independent non-profit organization which publishes Con-
sumer Reports, a monthly evaluation of a number of consumer prod-
ucts. The organization's most valuable function is in providing the
consumer with specific reasons for its product ratings. These ratings
are based upon laboratory tests, simulated use tests, and the expert
opinion of company engineers. Its recent report on electrical toysi".
47
 6 Ariz. App. 213, 431 P.2d 108 (1967).
48 Id. at 220, 431 P.2d at 113.
o With respect to the private nature of the product liability suit, it has been noted
that:
Only the individual who has been injured may initiate the suit. Even if the
harm suffered was caused by an arguably unsafe design feature, there is no cer-
tainty that the injured party will seek money damages from the manufacturer.
There are several possible reasons for this. The individual or his family may not
need monetary compensation. They may not wish to relive in the courtroom the
traumatic experience of the accident. More significantly, they may not suspect
that they might have a cause of action.
Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 32 ATL L.J. 52, 65 (1968).
5° Hearings on H.R. 10987, 7621, 7509 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce & Fi-
nance of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15
(1969) (testimony of Arnold Elkind) [hereinafter cited as Hearings an H.R. 109871.
51 Consumer Reports, Nov., 1968, at 585-91.
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provided a comparative evaluation of the safety of all electrical toys on
the market.
Underwriters' Laboratories (UL) attaches its seal of approval
to 800,000 different products, manufactured by more than 8,000 com-
panies. Each year UL tests more than 20,000 new products, retests
150,000 and distributes over 1,100,000,000 seals.' A manufacturer
wishing to use the seal is required to submit a product sample for test-
ing and to pay the expense of such tests." If the product satisfies UL's
safety requirements, the manufacturer's name is published on a list
specifying that he is authorized to attach the UL seal to the product.
Once approved, a product is retested periodically at the expense of the
manufacturer. The retesting procëdure is designed to assure that the
quality of the product continues to conform to that of the sample
tested. Underwriters' Laboratories does not furnish the public with any
information as to which products were submitted and rejected.
Regarding toys, UL has been concerned principally with testing
those which are electrically operated. In September, 1969, the company
revised its Standards for Safety for Electric Toys." The standard for
mechanical assembly, for example, requires that
a heating element shall be supported in a substantial and
reliable manner and shall be completely protected against
contact with any outside objects."
Thus, products in which heating elements are exposed to the user do
not qualify for the UL seal. The standard for acceptable tempera-
tures originally permitted a maximum of 302 °F "on any exposed
surface."u 6 Thus, although a toy might be denied the seal for an ex-
posed heating element, the standards did not preclude surface tempera-
tures sufficient to create a serious risk of burn.
The 1969 revision was undertaken in response to recommendations
of the Commission." The new standards are specifically applicable to
toy appliances, and provide that such products may.generate maximum
temperatures of 225°F" on "a surface that can be touched by casual
contact,"" provided the product is plainly marked "CAUTION—
contact with . . . will cause burns. Do not touch.76° Those products
with a maximum surface temperature of 117 0 F61 are required to bear
the milder warning "CAUTION—Very warm . . . Do not touch." 62
52 Dickerson, Report on Product Safety, 43 Ind. L.J. 186, 281 (1968).
53 Id. at 282.
54 Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., Standards for Safety—Electric Toys (Oct. 1966),
as revised, Underwriters' Laboratories Bulletin (Oct. 28, 1969).
55 Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., Standards for Safety—Electric Toys IT 17, at 7
(Oct. 1966).
56 Id. at 15, Table II.
57 Hearings on H.R. 10987, at 7.
58 Underwriters' Laboratories Bulletin 6 (Oct. 28, 1969).
to Id. at 5.
60 Id. at 9.
61 Id. at 6.
62 Id. at 9.
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Testimony before the Commission" and before the House Sub-
Committee on Commerce and Finance" pointed out several weaknesses
in UL's procedures as well as its standards. Under the procedures
previously used, a product could appear on the market bearing a UL
seal when, in fact, only the electrical cord was approved." Conse-
quently, the consumer would assume that UL had tested and approved
the entire product. Since the Commission's hearings, this practice has
been corrected." The Commission noted a second procedural problem
as being responsible for the award of the UL seal to certain toy ap-
pliances which should have been deemed hazardous." For example,
UL had approved a toy cornpopper the design of which permitted
water, during washing, to enter the heater housing and remain there.
The presence of water created a serious risk of shock during subse-
quent use." It was pointed out to the Commission that UL has no
specific requirements against such a hazard." "[T]hey merely look at
it from the standpoint of its safety as an engineered electrical item
rather than its use. . . . They don't pass on the utility of it." 7°
Although private testing organizations play a valuable role in
protecting the consumer from unsafe products, that role is limited for
several reasons. For example, UL's standards and procedures permit
only a simple pass-fail type of grading. This type of reporting engen-
ders in the consumer a simple safe-unsafe judgement about the
product. It is not disclosed where the line is drawn between those
products which pass and those which fail. Nor are the procedures and
standards utilized to make the determination disclosed to the consumer.
For these reasons, the consumer is unable to judge the degrees of
safety between the best unsafe product and the worst safe product. It
is submitted that these organizations should cooperate toward the de-
velopment of uniform standards and adopt a practice of publicizing
the criteria on which their quality ratings are based.
Another major limitation on the effectiveness of private testing or-
ganizations such as UL is the fact that submission of the product is
wholly voluntary. Thus, any manufacturer can avoid unfavorable test
results merely by not submitting the product. Consequently, the con-
sumer has no way of knowing whether those products marketed without
the seal were submitted and rejected, or were not submitted.
Recognizing the inability of private testings groups alone to in-
sure product safety, Morris Kaplan of Consumers Union commented:
CU recognizes the need for consumer education. . . . Never-
theless, we are convinced that it is easier and bettei to design
03 See Interim Report 12.
84 Hearings on H.R. 10987, at 80 (testimony of Arnold Elkind).
65 Id.
60
 Id.
87 Interim Report 12.
88 Id.
00
 Id.
70
 Hearings on H.R. 10987, at 80 (testimony of Arnold Elkind).
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the product to accept human foibles as a fact of life than to
try to educate millions of people to adapt themselves to the
foibles . . . of the designer.
Accidents can result from a product inadequately de-
signed for safety, carelessly put together .. or carelessly
used. . . . The first two are the full responsibility of in-
dustry, the third a matter of consumer education."
Both the United States of America Standards Institute (USASI)
and the Toy Manufacturers of America (TMA) have attempted to
reduce the number of product-related injuries by emphasizing the es-
tablishment of standards rather than the education of the consumer.
USASI does not develop standards but coordinates those developed by
its member companies, and approves those standards which have been
developed according to its procedures." The Institute operates on a
consensus principle, requiring the agreement of all interested parties
before a standard is approved. Income is derived solely from dues
assessed against each member company based upon its annual sales."
The major factor limiting USASI's effectiveness in achieving prod-
uct safety is its domination by industrial and commercial interests.
Although the organization professes to represent both industrial and
consumer interests, a recent study of its constitution, by-laws and
organizational structure concluded that active consumer participation
is fragmentary and insubstantial." With respect to this problem, it has
been observed that
[t]he most serious question raised about the process [of es-
tablishing private standards] is one of involvement—whether
the affected interests, including the consumer, participate
in developing the standard by which a product is measured.
. . . The end consumer is more often not represented."
Furthermore, because the by-laws of the Institute contain no provision
for disqualifying a member company from a given case on the basis of
conflict of interest, a company whose interests would be adversely
affected by a proposed standard may pass on the adoption of that
standard."
The inadequacies inherent in USASI's procedures were exem-
plified during the publicity which preceded passage of the National
71- Statement of David A. Swankin, representative of Consumers Union, before the
National Commission on Product Safety, October 1, 1969, at 2-3 (quoting Morris Kaplan)
(on file in the office of B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev.).
72
 Hearings on H.R. 10987, at 189.
73 Id. at 189-93.
74 Opala, The Anatomy of Private Standards-Making Process: The Operating Pro-
cedures of the USA Standards Institute, 22 Okla. L. Rev. 45 (1969).
75 Hearings on S.J. Res. 33 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1967).
76 Opala, supra note 74, at 61.
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Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. 77
 In fact, USASI's
failure to develop any effective safety standards for automobile equip-
ment may have accelerated the involvement of the federal govern-
ment in establishing such standards. An Institute statement had
previously admitted that under its procedures "votes are weighed
rather than counted." 78 "An objection by the automobile industry,
or even a major automobile company, would be enough to outweigh
all opposing votes."" Since the establishment of the Commission sev-
eral changes have taken place at USASI. 8° However, in light of its
history of domination by industry, it is doubtful that USASI can ever
adequately represent the consumer in the area of product safety.
Toy Manufacturers of America, Inc. (TMA) represents 80 per-
cent of the domestic toy market in the United States." In 1955 this
organization formed a standing committee known as the Safety
Standards Committee. Its purpose is to coordinate and direct industry
efforts toward toy safety. Since its inception, however, the Commit-
tee's only accomplishments has been the development of a standard
requiring that "lead free" paint be used on toys." Other standards
are in the planning stage with respect to stuffed toys, dolls and play-
ground equipment. 83 TMA's meager efforts in the field of toy safety
during the past 15 years is due to two factors. First, the major limita-
tion on self-regulation in the toy industry has been the nature of the
industry itself. The toy market is an extremely competitive one in which
the difference of a few cents per product can have a significant impact
on the manufacturer. Chairman Elkind aptly described the peculiarities
of the toy industry:
As I understand it, there is a very short season for toys.
There is a great deal of secrecy; very little cross-fertilization
of manufacturing. . . . [Manufacturers] spend a good deal of
money to protect their toys because they want to hit it with a
bang and sell a lot at Christmas.""
Another factor inhibiting the efficacy of voluntary efforts toward
product safety is that TMA, although representing almost the entire
industry, possesses no enforcement powers over those members who
fail to adhere to its safety standards. As a voluntary trade association,
TT 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (Supp. III, 1968). See generally R. Nader, Unsafe at Any
Speed (1965).
78
 As quoted in R. Nader, supra note 77, at 192.
73
 Id.
so Hearings on H.R. 10987, at 8. Changes at USASI include (1) creation of a Board
of Standards Review to provide for public review of all standards, (2) acceleration of the
standards-making process, and (3) creation of a Consumer Product Safety Committee
within the Consumer Council for the purpose of providing USASI with information
to aid in the development and revision of safety standards.
81
 Id. at 151 (statement of Jerome M. Freyer, att'y for TMA).
82 USA Standard Specifications to Minimize Hazards to Children from Residual
Surface Coating Materials, id. at 287.
83 Id. at 151 (statement of Jerome M. Freyer).
84 Id. at 81.
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TMA only publicizes its recommendations to member companies. Al-
though the by-laws of the association empower it to require as a con-
dition of membership that member companies adhere to its standards,
it has never done so. 85
 For these reasons the association has not had a
significant influence on the safety of toy products.
It appears that although consumer education performs a valu-
able function, product safety can only be achieved by improving the
quality of the product. Industry self-regulation has not been effective.
Lack of consumer participation in establishing standards or proce-
dures for setting standards, lack of cooperation within the industry
itself, the absence of adequate sanctions for noncompliance, and the
reluctance to sacrifice style and creativity for safety are several
factors which contribute to this result. Recognizing these factors, the
85 Id. at 171. A trade association may incur liability under the federal antitrust laws
by regulating the conduct of its members. Counsel for the TMA has noted that the pos-
sibility of antitrust liability has influenced the Association to refrain from taking dis-
ciplinary action to enforce any requirement that members comply with standards set by
the Association. Id. at 170. The cases in this area, however, indicate that absent agree-
ment to fix prices or suppress competition, a trade association may employ reasonable
measures to regulate the conduct of its members.without violating the antitrust laws.
For example, in Roofire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 202 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tenn.
1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963), it was
alleged that UL conspired with defendant Royal to restrain trade by causing UL to re-
fuse to test plaintiff's fire protection device, thereby greatly curtailing its marketability.
The court found no agreement among defendants to fix prices nor suppress competition
among such devices. 202 F. Supp. at 168. Underwriters' refusal to test was predicated
upon the product's failure to meet certain minimum standards. The court observed:
The Sherman Act is not intended to reach normal and usual contracts or com-
binations which are incidental to lawful purposes. . . An association formed
to foster high standards, to mitigate evils in trade existing through lack of
knowledge or information ... is not to be condemned as an undue restraint of
interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman Act merely because it may effect
a change in market conditions. . . . The Act sets such standards of reasonable-
ness, and a restraint is not unlawful unless it is ureasonable.
202 F. Supp. at 169.
But see Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961),
where the Court found certain conduct of a trade association amounted to a group boy-
cott and a restraint of trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 658-60.
The American Gas Ass'n refused to apply its seal of approval to plaintiff's gas burner
having determined that it did not meet the association's safety standards. As a result,
defendant utility company refused to supply gas to such burners. The Court found that
the association's tests were arbitrary and not based upon objective standards, and that
plaintiff's burner was safer, more efficient and as durable as similar products which had
been approved by the association.
It appears that if a trade association's purpose is to foster higher standards of quality
and safety, and its determinations are based upon objective criteria, its conduct would
not violate the antitrust laws. It has been noted:
Any system of standards pre-supposes that there are standard and non-standard
items. Those who produce products which are not standard are to some extent
penalized and trade is to some extent restrained. This much however is congres-
sionally sanctioned . .
Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Assoc., 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Ore.
1966).
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federal government has assumed an active role in insuring the safety
of toys through legislation.
IV. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The history of the federal government's role in toy safety is
reflected in several amendments to the Federal Hazardous Substances
Act." The original statute was passed in 1960 in response to reports
that thousands of children were being poisoned, burned, overcome by
fumes, and otherwise accidentally injured through contact with un-
labeled or inadequately labeled hazardous household chemicals." Under
the Act the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare was vested
with authority to regulate the labeling of certain classes of products
which he determined to be hazardous as containing corrosive, irritant,
extremely flammable, strongly sensitive or radioactive substances." To
enforce the provisions of the Act, the Secretary was authorized to seize
any misbranded package containing a hazardous substance," to exam-
ine and investigate the manufacturer's records, to inspect production
and storage sites, and to obtain samples of the substances.°° Introduc-
tion into interstate commerce of any misbranded package containing a
hazardous substance constituted a misdemeanor under the statute and
was punishable by a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not
more than 90 days."
As originally enacted the law was inadequate for several reasons.
It was limited to hazards of a chemical nature and applied only to
products marketed in a package or container to which a label could
be attached. The law also did not authorize the Secretary to remove
88 15 U.S.C.	 1261 et seq. (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1969), as further
amended, Pub. L. No. 91-113, § 2(a) (D) et seq., 83 Stat. 187 (Nov. 6, 1969).
87 See Hearings on S. 3298 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-23 (1966) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 3298].
88
 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (1964) sets out the following definitions:
For purposes of this chapter
(g) The term "toxic" shall apply to any substance ... which has the capacity
to produce personal injury or illness to man through ingestion, inhalation, or ab-
sorption through any body surface.
(h) (1) The term "highly toxic" means any substance which . . . [p]roduces
death . • . when orally administered; or when inhaled . . . in concentration[s]
.. . likely to be encountered by man when the substance is used in any reason-
ably foreseeable manner; or . . . when administered by continuous contact with
the bare skin for twenty-four hours or less ... .
(i) The term "corrosive" means any substance which in contact with living
tissue will cause destruction of tissue by chemical action . . .
(1) The term "extremely flammable" shall apply to any substance which has
a flash point at or below twenty degrees Fahrenheit . . . and the term "flam-
mable" shall apply to any substance which has a flash point of above twenty
degrees to and including eighty degrees Fahrenheit . . .
89 15 U.S.C. § 1265 (1964).
90 15 U.S.C. § 1270(b) (1964).
91 15 U.S.C. §§ 1263-64 (1964).
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those products from the market which, despite the presence of a
warning label, presented a serious risk of injury. This omission ren-
dered the Act largely ineffective in protecting small children from
injury, since they are generally unable to read or understand the printed
warnings on the container or package. Addressing himself to this
problem, Dr. James Goddard, Commissioner of the Food and Drug
Administration, noted:
Articles intended for use by children that would be very
likely to cause substantial injury . . . can be sold if labeled
"Keep out of the reach of children." Such a warning is, of
course, inconsistent with the whole purpose of the sale of the
article. It makes no sense to label a toy, for example, "Keep
out of the reach of children."92
In response to the inadequacy of cautionary labeling as a means
of reducing injury to children, the original statute was amended in
1966." The amended version contained a new category, designated
"banned hazardous substance," which included "any toy, or other
article intended for use by children, which is a hazardous substance,
or . . . contains a hazardous substance." 94 The definition of hazardous
substance remained the same as in the original statute, that is, it was
limited to chemical substances. Most significant, however, was the au-
thority given to the Secretary to declare a product a "banned hazardous
substance," and to remove it from the market if it was determined that
cautionary labeling was not sufficient to protect the public against
injury."
Since the 1966 amendments, the Secretary has made extensive
use of this new authority, and in so doing has significantly increased
the protection afforded children against hazardous substances." How-
ever, because the Act was limited in scope to hazards of a chemical
nature, the Secretary was powerless to act against products which by
reason of a design defect presented hazards of a mechanical, thermal
or electrical nature. For example, simulated home appliances and toys
containing sharp protrusions and edges were not covered by the 1966
amendments, yet have been shown to present a substantial risk of
injury.
In response to this situation, the Act was further amended in
November, 1969, to extend coverage to hazards of an electrical, me-
chanical or thermal nature." The amended Act also authorizes the
92 Hearings on S. 3298, at 14.
93 Child Protection Act of 1966, IS U.S.C. 3 1261(1) (2) et seq. (Supp. III, 1966).
04 15 U.S.C. § 1261(q) (1) (Supp. III, 1966).
95
 15 U.S.C. § 1261(q) (1) (Supp. III, 1966).
98 See Hearings on S. 1590, 1689 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 39-42 (1969).
DT Child Protection and Toy Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-113, 83 Stat. 187
(Nov. 6, 1969).
Section 2(d) of the Act provides that the following new subsections be added to 15
U.S.C. 1261:
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Secretary to take immediate action against a product without afford-
ing the parties an opportunity to be heard prior to seizure if, be-
cause of such a hazard, he determines that "distribution of the toy or
other article involved presents an imminent hazard to the public
health . ..."" Finally, the Act was amended to provide for repurchase
along the distributive chain of any article determined to be a banned
hazardous substance. Pursuant to this provision, a retailer is required
to repurchase the product from the consumer; the distributor must
repurchase from the retailer, and the manufacturer is required to re-
purchase from the distributor."
V. THE PRESENT LEGISLATION: A PRACTICAL SOLUTION
The Child Protection and Toy Safety Act of 1969 provides the
regulatory framework necessary for the promotion of toy safety. The
Act is particularly adaptable to the two unique characteristics of the
toy industry. As was pointed out to the Commission, the marketing of
(r) An article may be determined to present an electrical hazard if, in
normal use or when subjected to reasonable foreseeable damage or abuse, its
design or manufacture may cause personal injury or illness by electrical shock.
(s) An article may be determined to present a mechanical hazard if, in
normal use or when subjected to reasonably foreseeable damage or abuse, its
design or manufacture presents an unreasonable risk of personal injury or illness
(1) from fracture, fragmentation, or disassembly of the article, (2) from propul-
sion of the article (or any part or accessory thereof), (3) from points or other
protrusions, surfaces, edges, openings, or closures, (4) from moving parts, (5)
from lack or insufficiency of controls to reduce or stop motion, (6) as a result of
self-adhering characteristics of the article, (7) because the article (or any part
or accessory thereof) may be aspirated or ingested, (8) because of instability, or
(9) because of any other aspect of the article's design or manufacture.
(t) An article may be determined to present a thermal hazard if, in normal
use or when subjected to reasonably foreseeable damage or abuse, its design or
manufacture presents an unreasonable risk of personal injury because of heat as
from heated parts, substances, or surfaces." (Emphasis added.)
08 Pub. L. No. 91-119 2 (b), 83 Stat. 187 (Nov. 6, 1969).
In the absence of a determination by the Secretary that the product presents an
imminent health hazard, two alternative courses for regulation-making are available to
the Secretary. Regulations may be issued in accordance with the procedures under either
§ 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1964), or § 371 of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371 (1964). Pub. L. No. 91-113
§ 2 (b) , 83 Stat. 187 (Nov. 6, 1969).
Under § 553 of the APA, the Secretary is required to give notice in the Federal
Register of proposed regulations. Interested persons are given an opportunity to submit
their views in writing. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b),(c) (1964). There is no provision for a formal
public hearing, however, the Child Protection and Toy Safety Act expressly provides
that any person adversely affected by the regulation may petition a United States court
of appeals within 60 days. The court may set aside any determination of the Secretary
found not to be supported by substantial evidence. Id.
Under § 371(e) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)
(1964), the procedures are similar except for the provision that a public hearing may be
requested by any person adversely affected by the proposed regulation. 21 U.S.C.
§ 371(e) (1)-(3) (1964). Review may be sought in a United States court of appeals
of any order issued pursuant to such a hearing. 21 U.S.C. § 371(1) (1964).
90 Pub. L. No. 91-113, § 4(a), 83 Stat. 187 (Nov. 6, 1969).
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new toys is limited largely to the holiday season,'" and all of the
industry's products are marketed simultaneously and appear in almost
every major department store during this season. These two important
factors facilitate government supervision of the toy industry because
both the time and place of product distribution are narrowly limited.
Thus, one possible obstacle to enforcement, locating the offending prod-
uct, is substantially reduced.
Ideally, the most effective way of insuring product safety is
direct government involvement in the initial stages of production.
However, it is doubtful that this degree of intervention would be ap-
propriate in the toy industry. First, there are almost one thousand
toy manufacturers in the United States."' Second, because novelty ap-
peals to children, the toy industry designs many new and different
products each year. These factors would make direct government par-
ticipation in the early stages of toy production both difficult and im-
practical.
It is submitted, however, that through vigorous enforcement and
industry cooperation, the present Act will have substantially the
same effect as if the government were to assume the position it now
occupies, for example, in the field of motor vehicle safety. Under the
provisions of the Act, the Secretary is authorized to obtain and test
samples of toys which might present a health hazard to the public.'
The Act authorizes the Secretary to publicize the facts and data on
which he bases his determination.'" Once the enforcement process has
begun, these publications will be available to guide toy manufacturers
in the design of future products. Furthermore, by alerting the con-
sumer, these publications will also serve to reduce injury from products
already purchased. The Act also entitles the consumer to return the
product to the retailer for repurchase.'"
To increase the effectiveness of the Act, it is suggested that a pro-
cedure for the voluntary submission of new products should be initi-
ated. In the absence of such a procedure, a manufacturer about to
begin production on a new item must refer to the regulations of the
Department. If the new product is similar to existing toys, and such
regulations are detailed, he can design the product to satisfy the gov-
ernment's requirements. However, if the new product has not been
passed upon by the Department, the manufacturer will be denied any
assurance that he is complying with the standards. Submission of such
products for a clearance ruling would remove such uncertainty.
The Act is an acknowledgement that the goal of toy safety can
best be achieved by the cooperative effort of both government and
industry. However, if a manufacturer disregards a regulation of the
100
 See note 84 supra.
101 Hearings on H.R. 10987, at 147.
102 15 U.S.C. § 1270(b) (1964).
103 15 U.S.C. § 1273 (1964).
104 Pub. L . No. 91-113, § 4(a), 83 Stat. 187 (Nov. 6, 1969).
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Secretary on a similar product, or fails to voluntarily submit a ques-
tionable new product, he runs the substantial risk of having his in-
ventory seized, being required to repurchase those products already
distributed throughout the market, and of subjecting himself to the
criminal penalties of the Act. In light of the substantial investment
involved, it is submitted that the possibility of such action will pro-
vide the necessary impetus to assure that manufacturers will consider
the safety of their products of paramount importance.
CONCLUSION
One of the most complex problems generated by our industrial
society has been to promote product safety and reduce the number
of deaths and injuries from defectively designed and manufactured
products. The preceding survey of the toy safety problem is illustrative
of the use and adequacy of three principal mechanisms for promoting
safety in a type of product which has demonstrated a substantial risk of
injury. The private nature of the product liability suit and the difficult
problems of proof involved have rendered such suits largely ineffective
in promoting toy safety. 105 Furthermore, the lack of consumer partici-
pation in establishing. industry standards and the lack of cooperation
within the industry itself have made industry efforts to improve toy
safety largely ineffective. When it becomes clear that private controls
and remedies do not afford the degree of protection to which the con-
sumer is entitled, the federal government should take appropriate steps
to intervene in the factory or marketplace. It is submitted that the sanc-
tions embodied in the federal Child Protection and Toy Safety Act will
prompt the toy industry to cooperate with government toward the
elimination of dangerous design defects in toys.
THOMAS F. MAFFEI
1" The Act may indirectly benefit private plaintiffs in future suits regarding defec-
tive toys. Courts have generally held that violation of a safety standard constitutes
negligence per se. However, the courts are not unanimous regarding the evidentiary weight
to be given to standards incorporated in a statute, as compared with standards issued by
a regulatory agency pursuant to statutory authorization. It should be noted that in any
event the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk will still be
available. For a full discussion, see Comment, Products Liability Based Upon Violation of
Statutory Standards, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1389 (1866).
498
